Let Us Be Perfect, As Our Heavenly Father Is Perfect: An Exegesis of The Last Three Petitions of the Lord's Prayer in Matthew
Term paper for
NT 211: Gospels
Dr. Dan McCartney
Westminster Theological Seminary
Fall 2001
Tim Black

The Lord's Prayer is universally recognized throughout the Christian church as a model for believers' prayer, as a central expression of Christian theology, and as a central component of the church's liturgy. In view of this broad agreement, the tendency of Christians is to raise few critical questions, and entertain few doubts, about the meaning of the prayer, its differing versions and textual variants, and the reasons for its prominence in the liturgy, theology, and life of the church. This tendency is in accord with the reverence with which we ought treat the prayer. Modern critical scholarship, however, does not hesitate to entertain such doubts, and can either bring about the destruction of the faith of some, or more refined reflection upon the truth in others. As we will see, the questions sometimes handled carefully by the orthodox but also raised as problems by the critics should lead us to a deeper and fuller understanding of the true meaning and nature of the Lord's Prayer.

This paper will argue that the only adequate explanation of the meaning and structure of the last set of petitions in the Lord's Prayer in Matthew 6:11-13 is that those petitions respectively center around the issues of regeneration, justification, and sanctification, in their post-conversion application to the believer in the New Covenant context. In order to recognize this point, a broader context must be held in view: systematically, we must recognize that regeneration, justification, and sanctification each respectively find their place within the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of the covenant; and biblical-theologically, we must recognize that the last set of petitions request from God what He commanded man to provide in the first 3 commandments, what He promised to provide Himself in the New Covenant as described in Jer. 31:31-34 and Ezek. 36:25-27, which He definitively produced in Christ's life, death and resurrection, which He personalizes or implements in the life of the believer through the work of the Spirit initially in conversion and progressively in the Christian life, and which He perfects in the final glorification of every believer. This systematic and historical complex, which we may simply call the covenant, provides the only explanatory context within which the full meaning and structure of the last 3 petitions can be properly recognized.

Because it is one of the most prominent texts of scripture in the life of the church, the body of literature relating to the Lord's prayer is extensive. While there seems to have been an implicit recognition of the thesis of this paper throughout church history, it appears to the present author that nowhere throughout the history of the interpretation of this passage has the meaning and structure of the last 3 petitions been outlined in as clear or explicit a manner as in this paper.

The implication of this thesis is that the whole text of the last set of petitions, as it is found in Matthew 6:11-13, is original to Jesus, and should be treated accordingly by the church as well as the critics. This can be seen in the local context in that each of the last petitions is necessary for the meaning of the set of petitions to be complete as well as for the rest of the Sermon on the Mount to retain its coherence, and it can be seen in the broader context in that the petitions fit perfectly into the progress of the history of redemption as it is described in scripture.

Critics tend to raise questions about the different versions of the Lord's Prayer, and about the textual variants extant in the manuscript evidence for the text. These questions are of secondary importance to those dealing with the meaning of the text, but because they are matters of introduction, should be addressed first in this paper.

There are three versions of the text; they are found in Matt. 6:9-13, Luke 11:2-4, and the Didache 8.2. (We will not treat the relation of the Didache to the other versions here, because we are concerned about the canonical texts, and because the Didache's version is essentially identical to Matthew's.) There are certain differences between these versions. Luke's version is shorter than Matthew's, because it does not have the endings to the opening address, to the first set of petitions, and to the last set of petitions found in Matthew. Matthew's and Luke's versions also present different wordings of the last set of petitions. What are the reasons for these differences?

Jeremias (1967 89-94) holds that the difference in length is evidence that Luke's version is original to the liturgical tradition of the church, and perhaps thereby to Jesus, and that as a corollary, Matthew's version includes traditional or redactional additions of the early church's additional formulations--additions which go beyond what Jesus actually said.¹ Yet interestingly, Jeremias also takes the difference in wording to be evidence that Matthew's wording is the original. He takes Matthew's dos ("give") to be original and Luke's didou ("keep on giving") to be an explanation or revision of the original version, and Matthew's opheilemata ("debts") to be original and Luke's hamartiai ("sins") to be an interpretive explanation of the original. Likewise, he considers Matthew's aphekamen ("have forgiven") to be original, and Luke's aphiomen ("are forgiving" or "do forgive") to be an explanation of the original to a Greek-speaking audience. Basically, then, Jeremias holds that Luke's shorter form is original, but also that Matthew's wording is original so far as it corresponds with Luke's form. This perspective does not sound so bad until one realizes that Jeremias is at the same time saying that Matthew's additional words are not original to Jesus but rather are words generated by the church in order to fill out the meaning of the prayer and to give it a more balanced structure for use in liturgical settings. We will interact with Jeremias' perspective later in the paper.

Others hold that some of the petitions (not just parts of them) are not original to Jesus. Hagner (1993 146) considers the sixth petition to be derived from church tradition, and not original to Jesus. Davies (1988 612) concurs.² Conservatives (such as Witsius (1839), Ridderbos (1987) and Plummer³) tend to hold that all of the petitions in Matthew are original to Jesus.

The textual variants are generally considered by conservatives and critics alike to be of less concern than the differences between the versions. The variants are primarily found in Luke, and not in Matthew. The variants in Luke largely supply what is found in Matthew's version. The variant ending in Matthew ("for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever") is traditionally used in the liturgy of the church but most modern scholars agree that it is not original to the text One variant in Matthew adds a trinitarian formulation to this extended ending.⁴

Much of the meaning of the last three petitions of the Lord's Prayer, and of the prayer as a whole, is agreed upon by Christians, but there are some important questions to consider which have resulted in widely-diverging opinions about the precise meaning of the prayer and its parts.

Of first importance, some ask whether or not the prayer is truly Christian. It does not mention many things that cannot already be found in first-century Judaism. Perhaps it is Jewish and not Christian. But most interpreters, and most Christians, take the prayer to be central to Christianity, and to be a central expression of Christian doctrine.⁵ They do so because Jesus spoke the prayer, because He addresses God as "Our Father," because He proclaimed the kingdom, and because the last set of petitions seems to focus on Christian concerns.⁶ Tertullian held that the Prayer's general function was to serve as a "summary of the Christian proclamation" and "as a basic text of ethics," (Luz: 1989 375) and is a "breviary of the whole gospel." (372)

Regarding the meaning of the last set of petitions, there is disagreement as to whether they are as eschatological in focus as the first set of petitions are. Some hold that the second set of petitions are only requests for God to bless man in the present, with temporal blessings. The fourth petition would seem to fit this pattern: "Give us this day our daily bread." Others say that the second set of petitions is as eschatological as the first, and tend toward spiritualizing the meaning of the fourth petition.

This brings to light the issues of the unity and structure of the last set of petitions. Some question whether or not the fourth petition fits with the other petitions because of its apparent concern about material things rather than spiritual things. Others, as we have seen, think that the last petition is not original, and therefore does not fit with the others. Further questions arise concerning the order of the petitions. Is there a process of reasoning assumed in the petitions which accounts for their order? Are physical needs a prerequisite to soteriological needs, or are their provision of the substance of salvation? Is forgiveness only possible after God gives something to man? Does the fifth petition deal with past sins, and the sixth with future sins?

Further questions arise concerning the meaning of the individual petitions. No one has a definitive answer as to the meaning of "epiousion" in the fourth petition. The reasoning in the fifth petition is hard to understand; how is our forgiving others related to God's forgiving us? It is not immediately obvious whether the sixth petition's reference to tou ponerou is to a general principle of "evil" or to a personal agent, "the evil one." Further, many commentators cavil at the thought that the sixth petition is implying that God can lead a person into temptation, because it would seem to place the blame on God for man's sin.

Because exegesis aims at discovering the meaning of the text rather than merely its linguistic, textual, and literary nature, we should place the text in its meaningful context before dealing with the more specific details of linguistic and textual introduction, and then after the introductory matters, we will move on to the meaning of the text.

The petitions are the second half of the Lord's prayer. The first half of the prayer petitions God to do things on His own behalf (Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done), and the second half petitions God to do things more obviously on our behalf (Give us..., forgive us..., lead us not...but deliver us). The prayer itself (in Matthew) is part of Jesus' "Sermon on the Mount," where He introduces His kingdom and instructs his disciples regarding life within it. Jesus presents the prayer as a model for how His disciples as citizens of His kingdom should pray. Jesus' kingdom is the extension and further implementation of God's reign in the OT, especially as it is the implementation of the New Covenant in Christ. As such, the last set of petitions in the Lord's Prayer are a prayer for the blessings of the kingdom, for the blessings of the covenant, and especially, for the blessings of the New Covenant. After having introduced them in the model prayer, Jesus structures the rest of the Sermon on the Mount (6:16-7:27) as an explanation of the implications of these blessings for life in the covenant.⁷

The background of the petitions is found most prominently in the first 3 commandments, which are the central description of the Old Covenant,⁸ and in Jer. 31:31-34 and Ezek. 36:25-27, which present the promise of the New Covenant and of its central blessings.

The first 3 commandments respectively require man to bring his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics (or being, thought, and activity) into accord with God's metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. They further specify that the metaphysics of the covenant is composed primarily of God's commitments and requirements, its epistemology is expressed primarily in the modes of word- and deed-revelation, and that its ethics is active primarily in the dynamics or activities of God's sovereign administration and man's responsible reception. Within this structure they teach that man may only bring his being, thought, and activity into accord with God's by recognizing the priority of God's commitment over His requirement, of God's word(s) over His deed(s), and His administration over man's reception. (1) Man's being must be wholly committed to God, in accord with God's prior commitment to man ("I will be your God, and you shall be my people;" "circumcise your hearts"), (2) man's thoughts about God's deeds of creation, providence, and redemption must be wholly guided by God's interpretive word, in which context man is declared righteous ("those who love me") and receives God's faithful blessing (hesed) and even forgiveness, or else man disobeys God's verbal commandments (plural, not singular--image-worship goes against the nature of commandment-keeping by constructing a false word-interpretation of God's (and man's) deeds) and comes under God's declaration that man is evil and guilty ("visiting the iniquity upon...those who hate Him"), (3) and man must responsibly ("will not hold him guiltless") receive, use, and respond to ("take") God's activity and the reputation He has for what He has done ("the name of YHWH") in a manner that accords with God's activity ("not...in vain"). The fourth commandment summarizes these first three, and the last six express their implications for all of life. If man will only do these first three things, he will keep the Sabbath, and the other six commandments as well. As we will see, without recognizing this structure of the covenant as a background to the petitions, the meanings of the fourth and sixth petitions of the Prayer remain difficult to discern.

Jeremiah 31:31-34 promises that in the New Covenant, God will give what He commanded His people to provide. God will renew the structure and orientation⁹ of His people's hearts--the core of their being. "I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people." (33) He will also renew their thinking as well as their record of righteousness in His eyes--they will judge in accord with His judgment. "And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, 'Know the LORD,' for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the LORD. For I will forgive their iniquity, and remember their sins no more." (34)

Ezekiel 36:25-26 likewise promise that God will give what He commanded: a new heart, record, and life. First, the new record: "I will sprinkle clean water on you, and you shall be clean from all your uncleannesses, and from all your idols I will cleanse you." (25) Second, the new heart: "And I will give you a new heart, and a new spirit I will put within you. And I will remove the heart of stone from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh." (26) Third, the new life: "And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes and be careful to obey my rules." (27)

In the New Covenant, then, we should expect God to give a new heart, new record, and new life to His people, thereby renewing their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics--their whole life--and bringing it into accord with His own.

And that is precisely what God does. The covenant God established with His people, now they will keep. Prior to His death and resurrection, Jesus instructs His disciples to pray for the blessings of the New Covenant to be applied to their lives, so that after He has produced those blessings, they will continue to pray for them, and will receive them. The development of the theology of personal and individual salvation presented in the New Testament begins with Jesus' statements that being born again, forgiveness, and holiness of life are necessary for one to be found within His kingdom, and ends in the more explicit presentation in Paul of the doctrines of regeneration, justification, and sanctification. In Paul the history of salvation comes into sharper focus: God created man perfect in his being, thought, and activity, man lost that original perfection when he sinned, the Old Covenant led into and the New Covenant definitively began the restoration and surpassing of that original perfection, and final glorification will perfect man fully, conclusively, and irreversibly. The Lord's Prayer stands as man's request for God to carry out this whole process from beginning to end, for God's glory. The last set of petitions in the Lord's prayer have the whole process in view, but are intended to be prayed primarily by believers who have already experienced the initial implementation of these central blessings of the New Covenant at their conversion, and whose immediate need is for the continued outflow of those blessings to be increasingly implemented in their lives, leading on to final perfection in their glorification. It is this historia of the ordo salutis, and ordo of the historia, which each of the petitions of the Lord's Prayer has in view, and within which context the Lord's Prayer has its meaning.

Now let us justify our decisions about the boundaries and divisions of the text. I have chosen to treat the version of the Lord's Prayer found in Matthew 6:9-13, for reasons mentioned in the section titled "Determination of the original text." That section deals with the critics' views; this one lays the groundwork for doing so.

The second set of petitions is set off from the first set of petitions, and from what follows the prayer, most obviously by the consistent use of second person singular imperatival constructions followed by the first person plural personal pronoun "us" ("Give us...forgive us...lead us...deliver us"). Slightly less obvious is the way that the internal unity of the petitions with one another is indicated by their being joined to each other by the conjunction "and" (kai) at the beginning of the fifth and sixth requests.¹⁰ Even less obvious is the pattern of couplets in this set of petitions; each petition is composed of two halves of similar length. This pattern lends a rhetorical balance to the last set of petitions, and a rhythm that is different from the rhythm of the first set of petitions.

This delineation of the boundary is reinforced by the consistent use of the third person singular imperative verbs followed by objects qualified by the genitive second person singular possessive pronoun "your" in the first three petitions. Thus the first set of petitions is clearly a request for God to act primarily on His own behalf, and the second set is a request for God to act on behalf of "us." The boundary is further reinforced by the use of the conjunction "for" (hoti) on the (probably not original) ending to the prayer, and by the conjunction "for" (gar) introducing v. 14 followed by a conditional "if...then also" (ean...kai) construction in the body of v. 14, coordinated with the contrasting "but" (de) introducing v. 15 followed by a conditional "if not...then neither" (ean me...oude) construction in the body of v. 15. In view of these considerations, the fact that there is no conjunction or other boundary marker at the beginning of the second set of petitions merely serves to maintain the brevity and unity of the prayer as a whole, and does not give any reason to think that the boundary does not exist.

We might further note that in Greek as well as in English, the "on earth as it is in heaven" of the third petition breaks the rhythm of the first three petitions, or rather, sets their rhythmic consonance off as a completed unit, and lends a conclusive finality to the third request, making the fourth request appear as the introduction of a new set of petitions. This conclusive function at the end of the third petition is expressed in the liturgical recitations in English-speaking worship services with which we are familiar by lowering the pitch of the final word "heaven," and by the extra pause made before the fourth petition.

The internal boundary-indicators noted above serve to indicate the divisions of the text. The verb-object constructions, and the conjunctions set off the petitions from one another. The only further question is whether there are three or four petitions. We must conclude that what some consider to be the last two petitions (v. 13) are grouped together as one unit that is distinct from the other two petitions (vv. 11 and 12), and as such v. 13 is one petition rather than two. This grouping is indicated by the "but" which contrasts the negative imperatival clause in 13a with the positive imperatival clause in 13b. Because the two clauses treat essentially the same topic ("lead not into temptation...deliver from [lead out of] evil"), it seems best to consider them both to be a part of the same petition.

As Metzger has argued above (footnote 4), we can safely assume that the ending some manuscripts give the text in v. 13 is not original to the text of Matthew or Luke. It would be outside the scope of the petitions (and therefore of our consideration as well) even if it were part of the original text.

The only further variant of any significance in Matthew, then, is the "amen" added at the end of the sixth petition. It can easily be seen to be a later addition to fit with the liturgy of the church in that its best manuscript attestation is from the Latin versions and Jerome in the 4^th and 5^th centuries. Again, this variant would be of little concern to us.

My arguments regarding these last two variants sound something like that of Jeremias, except that he is arguing that even what is found in the earliest manuscripts (a [aleph], A, B, P⁷⁵; early 3^rd to 5^th centuries) is not original to Jesus. My argument is based on text-critical considerations--lower criticism--and his on higher-critical considerations.¹¹ Jeremias agrees that the original text of Matthew is as I have delineated it, but disagrees that Matthew is quoting Jesus' words at every point of the prayer. Rather, he holds that Matthew is quoting church liturgical tradition to supply what is rhetorically lacking in Jesus' original formulation. Jeremias' reasons for this opinion are based on a comparison of the versions of the prayer presented in Matthew and Luke, and on his willingness to say that biblical authors may ascribe words and meanings to Jesus which Jesus did not in fact say.

In addition to what we mentioned earlier in the paper regarding Jeremias' position, we should note further that Jeremias prefers the Lukan version as original because of his theory regarding the manner in which liturgical traditions develop in the church. Generally, his theory is that liturgical traditions develop by adding to or rounding out the phrases used in liturgy, rather than by subtracting from the phrases received by tradition.¹² Assuming that Matthew and Luke are not quoting Jesus directly, but rather church tradition, Jeremias proceeds to conclude that because the phrases in Luke are less well-formed for liturgical purposes than are the phrases in Matthew, Luke must come from an earlier stage in the development of the tradition of the church, and Matthew from a later stage. Therefore Luke's version is the more "original."

While this argument may be convincing to some critical scholars, its problems are legion. The first problem is that Jeremias assumes that the text of Matthew and Luke is derived from the tradition of the church rather than directly from Jesus' words themselves. Both Matthew and Luke claim to be quoting Jesus directly. Jeremias himself admits that both Gospels must have been written around AD 75-85 (p. 86), which allows for only a very short time for divergent traditions to form: no more than 55 years. Richard Bauckham (1998) has argued (successfully, in my estimation) that the Gospel writers were not unaware of the church at large, and that the concept of separate traditions developing in separate communities or churches by the time of the composition of the Gospel narratives cannot be supported from the historical evidence available; rather, quite the opposite is indicated by the evidence. As leaders in the church, the evangelists were most likely cosmopolitan, in constant communication, and traveled among the churches as did Paul, Barnabas, Timothy, and others in the New Testament. It appears more likely, then, that the eyewitnesses and tradition of the church would push the evangelists to quote Jesus' words as Jesus actually said them--especially when the evangelists claimed that they were quoting Jesus' actual words--rather than to ascribe to Jesus what He did not say.

A further problem with Jeremias' perspective is that, as he himself admits, the Matthean version appears to retain the more literal wording; if this is the case, why would he not also retain the more original form?

Another consideration is that the Lukan version has more variants; the Matthean hardly any. Could it not be that later copyists (of Luke) added variants to Luke because they knew the Matthean version? It could be that they were supplying additional words from their knowledge of the church's liturgical tradition, as well, but from where did that tradition arise? It would appear that the tradition arose from the same source as the Matthean version, which itself appears to have the more original wording. Thus Luke is not necessarily the more original; rather, I would like to argue that both are original either by being given at different times (as Ridderbos suggests could be the case (1987 126), and Jeremias admits is possible (1967 91)) or by being two different recollections of the same giving by Jesus, perhaps being shortened by Luke for the purpose of emphasizing a certain point for his intended audience and to better fit with the particular literary context in Luke's Gospel.

We should note that Jeremias implicitly denies that Jesus spoke the additional words found in Matthew's version. In response, we should be concerned that the study of the issue of which wording is original to Jesus is to some extent at odds with the doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration. We hold that the very words of both Matthew and Luke are given to us as authoritative, clear, necessary and sufficient for our faith and practice, such that we may and ought to use both versions for instruction and liturgy, and so because both versions are stated in the text to be spoken by Jesus, we ought to consider them both to be original to Jesus. The differences between the texts must be noted and the significance of those differences sought out, but we may not reject the text of either version in whole or in part; both are fully God's word, and therefore both are fully Jesus' words.

But if this is the case, how can we account for the differences between the versions? Ridderbos says that "On questions like these, however, which form a part of the so-called synoptic problem, we do not have enough evidence to speak with certainty." (1987 127) Jeremias is willing to consider some of the differences to be due to the evangelist's desire to explain the meaning of Jesus' original wording to his audience; he holds that Luke uses the term "sins" rather than "debts" in order to explain the meaning to his non-Jewish audience. It appears that this suggestion can be accepted from the orthodox standpoint; Jeremias is recommending that we believe Luke's purpose was to faithfully represent Jesus' meaning. But when Jeremias says that the Matthean version includes redactional or traditional additions not original to Jesus, while the orthodox may be willing to grant that Matthew does so in order to further explain Jesus' meaning, they should not be willing to grant Jeremias' reasoning that the Matthean account expands upon the original Lukan version merely for the purposes of gaining a more balanced literary symmetry, or for the purpose of representing the phraseology used in the liturgy of the early church.¹³ The orthodox should be willing to grant that the biblical authors may quote or refer to their contemporary context without condoning the things in that context ("You have heard it said...;" "The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God;'" "In him we live and move and have our being,"), but must not be willing to grant that the biblical authors ascribe words and meanings to Jesus that He did not in fact say. For them to do so would be an impiety; from the time of Moses onward it was an explicit principle that the followers of JHWH must neither add to nor subtract from the words God speaks. (Dt. 12:32) So when Jeremias holds that the Matthean version is not original to Jesus, perhaps unwittingly he is in fact accusing the author of the Gospel of Matthew of a sin, as well as accusing the liturgy of the early church and all who have followed it since of that same sin. Jeremias would have us believe that Matthew added to Jesus' words, but the orthodox would rather believe that it is Jeremias who seeks to subtract from them. In view of the Jews'--and the Christians' (confer with John 20:30-31; 21:25; 1 Cor. 4:6; Rev. 22:18-19)--desire to be faithful to God's word, it appears more consonant with scripture and the tradition of the church to hold that the reason Luke's account is shorter is not that Matthew ascribed words to Jesus which were not spoken by Jesus, but rather that Luke may have decided not to quote Jesus in full, without changing the substance of those words of Jesus which he did choose to quote.

As a result there seems to be no reason to think that Matthew's version, and the reconstruction of it made via text-critical means, is anything but the very prayer which Jesus instructed His disciples to pray.

So let us dispense with the critical scholarship for the moment and examine the meaning of the text. In doing so we will still be implicitly answering the critics' critiques; this should become apparent in the section describing the implications of the meaning of the text.

We will attempt to use the latter half of the Sermon on the Mount as a commentary on the meaning of each petition.¹⁴ We will conclude the discussion of each petition's meaning with a discussion of the eschatological process which it has in view, in order to more clearly show each petition's location in the history of redemption, as well as its connections and harmonious unity with that history.

The last three petitions are a request for God to maintain and increase His redemptive work of renewing, perfecting, and glorifying our metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, by bringing it into accord with His own.

The fourth petition is our request for God to continue to support our whole being in its absolute commitment to God, in response to His being in absolute commitment to us.

This fact is seen first in the way the petition focuses on God's providence. Both commentators and Christians (as if there may be a distinction at times) universally recognize that the petition is requesting God to maintain His providential support of our existence. What few commentators recognize is that our existence as believers is qualified first by the fact that God has regenerated us by giving us new hearts, making us a "new creation" in Christ, and thereby making us the firstfruits of the new creation He will reveal at the consummation. The whole creation groans in eager expectation, waiting for the sons of God to be revealed. (Rom. 8:19, 22) The whole creation will one day be renewed, as a result of the perfection of the metaphysics of humanity, not only of our spirits, but "the redemption of our bodies" (Rom. 8:23) as well.¹⁵ "For in this hope we were saved." (Rom. 8:24) The goal of our initial regeneration is the final regeneration of all things. The means to this end is God's providential care of humanity in the present.

This metaphysical function of providence is brought to light slightly more when we recognize that God's activity may be summarized under the heads of creation, providence, and redemption. In creation God built the structure of creation, and dedicated or oriented it toward Himself; it was very good. In providence He sustains its existence, before and after the fall. In redemption He restores its original perfection, especially in regard to its orientation¹⁶ or commitment¹⁷ to Him.

But how does this petition request God to maintain His providential sustenance of our existence in commitment toward Him? It does so most obviously through its request of bread. Much speculation as well as correct biblical reflection has been generated regarding the meaning and connotations of "bread" in this context, but we may simply observe that bread is one kind of food, food which sustains man's life. In Hebrew, the word for bread, lechem, can be used to speak of food in general (Gen. 3:19; 28:20; Prov. 30:8), the fruit produced by trees (Jer. 11:19), and even milk (Prov. 27:27). This is as much as we need to know about bread; it need not be taken as a reference to Jesus as the Bread of life, or to the Eucharist. It is in its most basic meaning a reference to food, which sustains the life of the body. As such it is a reference to God's providential sustenance of His people, and a request for God to maintain His providential care.

The term ton epiousion modifies the noun "bread" (ton arton) here. The meaning of this term is uncertain. It is only found in Greek literature in the Lord's Prayer as it is given in Matthew and Luke, and in secondary literature which quotes or interacts with these passages of scripture. There is no common usage in Greek literature on which to depend in order to determine its meaning.¹⁸ As a result we must "rely on the context of the Lord's Prayer, on etymological considerations, and on Patristic and versional evidence in seeking to ascertain the meaning of this elusive word."¹⁹ For the sake of being careful we should note that the typical meanings commentators are willing to ascribe to the term are "daily bread," "that which belongs to it," "supersubstantial," "what is needful for existence," "only what is needful," "bread for tomorrow," "tomorrow's bread," and "eschatological bread." One of the chief advantages of the view that the reference is to "tomorrow's bread" is that it makes the request seem more obviously eschatological. But I contend that it is not the temporal reference of the other two petitions that indicates an eschatological focus; rather, it is the substance of what is requested that gives them an eschatological focus. Such is the same in regard to the petition for bread. Providence is as eschatological today as it is tomorrow.²⁰ While the modifier epiousion may indicate a function of the bread which it modifies, we should conclude in the end that our ignorance of its meaning should cause us to place more emphasis on the function of bread itself; of the bread itself, in order to understand the meaning of the petition. Grammatically and semantically, and I trust as a result, didactically and spiritually, the "bread" is more important than the "epiousion" modifying it. Bread is necessary to sustain our existence, and when it is given by God, it is a part of His providential provision for us. Ridderbos (1987 131) and others end with this method; so should we.

The search for the meaning of epiousion has, however, led many astray from understanding the petition as a whole--a result absolutely contrary to its purpose! I have found Herman Witsius' commentary on the Lord's Prayer to be the most insightful of all treatises examined on the subject, and his comment is telling: "I cannot allow myself to think of giving the smallest uneasiness to those Christians, whose thoughts, while they are uttering the fourth petition, are directed to our Lord Jesus Christ and his grace....Nothing, certainly, would be more unbecoming in a Divine, than to employ any sort of arguments for the purpose of interrupting religious meditation and inquiry, and to lead away the minds of men from solid and eternal to frail and perishing objects." (1839 267-268) Let us not waste our time on what seems impossible to understand, and turn to the plain meaning of the text insofar as we can ascertain it.

Witsius, then, is our hero for the moment, and we may note with profit that he explicitly states that the petition has God's providence in view.²¹ Betz does as well, speaking of God as "the creator and sustainer." (1995 379) Plummer (96) says that the first petition is a request for "provision." Morison comes even closer to my thesis by employing the word "being."²²

A further way in which the petition requests God to sustain our existence in commitment to Him is in its use of the words "give" and "our." It is calling to mind the metaphysics of commitment and requirement that are presented in the first commandment. Because God is committed to His people, to be their God, He promises to bless them. It is on the basis of this commitment, and this promise, that we may require God to bless us, to give us His blessings. So we ask Him to "give" us His blessings. Likewise, the bread is called "our" bread. It is bread that is oriented toward us, committed by God to be a blessing to us. The fact that our existence is centered around the commitment to God which He requires of us is brought out in the fact that by requiring God to "give" His blessings to us, we are committed to seeking blessings only from Him, and not from any other God. Likewise, just as there should be no other Gods "to us," no other bread should be "ours" than that which comes from God. We may only require God to express His commitment to us if we are reciprocally committed to Him; the gift may only be received if the Giver is as well.²³

Matthew 6:16-34 explains and applies this petition as follows. In view of God's progressive redemption of our whole beings, and with particular regard to His present providential sustenance of our lives, 1) we should gladly receive and trust in His blessings to us when we fast (vv. 16-18), 2) we should commit our hearts to treasure God and His blessings which He has committed to give us from and in heaven (19-21), 3) our heart's devotion to God should be pure and absolute (22-23), 4) it may not be given to another, even to His providential blessings (24), and 5) we need not be anxious that God's providence may fail, but must seek Him above all His blessings, for He is committed to us, and to bless us (25-34).

Many other aspects of the petition could be examined. But let us end with a recognition of the all-encompassing eschatology of metaphysics implied by God's providence. In Christ all things, even suffering, are a blessing to the believer (Rom. 8:28). He who did not spare His own Son will graciously give us all things (Rom. 8:32), and all things are ours in Christ (1 Cor. 3:22-23). Our hearts have been circumcised in Christ, raised with Him, our old man put off, our new man put on, being renewed after the image of God. (Col. 2:11-13; 3:1-3, 9-11) God's glory in creation, providence, and redemption (Ps. 104) is placed on its most grand display in man as the image of God, restored to His dominion over all creation (Ps. 8), in incomparable glory (Rom. 8:18), bringing about the regeneration of all things (Rom. 8:18-25), that God's name will be majestic in all the earth. From creation to regeneration to consummation, God is bringing all things into conformity to the radiance of His glorious being, through the work of Christ His Son. (Heb. 1:2-4; 2:5-10; Col. 1:15-20)

Clearly, then, the fourth petition is bound up with regeneration, providence, and the metaphysics of commitment and requirement. It is our request for God to bring our being into accord with His.

The fifth petition is a request for God to bring our epistemology into accord with God's, and for God to continue to declare²⁴ that we are forgiven of our many sins. As such it is a request for God to continue the work He began in our initial justification at conversion.

"Forgive us our debts." What is essential in this request is that God knows all things, and most significantly to us, He knows of all our sins against Him, and as a result apart from Christ we are unrighteous in His sight. The principle here is that God's knowledge is primary. We ask God to forgive us, not in order that He might act out of accord with what He knows about us (we are guilty!), but rather so that He will act in accord with what He knows about Himself (He is merciful!). According to the second commandment, He shows His "lovingkindness" or "mercy"--hesed--to those who love Him and keep His commandments--to those who respect the primacy of His knowledge. Fleshing out the meaning of the second commandment, God revealed His name to Moses, saying, "The LORD, the LORD, a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping steadfast love for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, but who will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children and the children's children, to the third and the fourth generation." (Ex. 34:6-7) God knows our sin, but also knows His great desire to forgive. It is only on this basis--God's knowledge of both His justice and mercy--that we may ask Him to forgive us.

"As we forgive our debtors." If we know God, we gain that knowledge by obeying His commandments. (Ps. 19; 111:10; 119) At issue is whether we listen to God's word as the interpretation of His deeds, or whether we construct our own false word-interpretation of His deeds, and of our deeds as well. The principle here is that man's knowledge is secondary, and must be derived from God's. If we know God, then we are taught of Him, and properly perceive the evil and guilt of our sin; we count our own guilt to be a debt we owe to God, and we recognize the debts of others toward us as well. But if we know God, we also understand that He is merciful and gracious, a forgiving God. And we act on it. We ask God to forgive us, and seek to extend that forgiveness to others.

The emphasis of the first half of the petition, then, is upon the primacy of God's knowledge, and the emphasis of the second half is upon the necessity of man's knowledge being in accord with God's. This first emphasis is easier to recognize in the petition, but the second one is more difficult. The second emphasis becomes more evident when we realize the meaning of the word "as" which connects the two halves. The word is not saying that our forgiveness provides the standard which God's forgiveness is obligated to match, but rather that our forgiveness manifests God's forgiveness, and that God's is the standard. Again, even this point is difficult to understand; the word "as" appears to draw the comparison in the opposite direction. But this point becomes slightly more obvious when we see that it is because our forgiveness is like God's that we may ask God to forgive us in a manner like unto our forgiveness of others. The "as" does ask God to forgive in a manner similar to the way that we forgive, but the comparison made by the word "as" cannot be made unless our forgiveness is properly patterned after God's. It is only if we judge things as God judges things, if we forgive when God forgives, and condemn when God condemns, that we have begun to understand what it means to ask God to "Forgive us our debts." Our knowledge must be in accord with God's in order for us to ask Him to forgive us. If our thinking does not manifest God's thinking, then we cannot ask Him for forgiveness, because we do not know what it is for which we ask. If our thinking does manifest God's thinking, because it is patterned after God's thinking and derived from it, then we see in our thoughts a reflection of His, and can point to our forgiveness "as" the kind of thing which we want God to do for us. In the process of asking God to forgive us, we are also asking Him to extend His forgiveness through us to others; we are asking for the redemption of our epistemologies, so that we will think God's thoughts after Him. (2 Cor. 5:11-21)²⁵

In the redemption of our epistemologies, we begin to predicate God's words of His deeds, and of our deeds as well. His words become our words, His interpretation our interpretation. He says that we have sinned, and so we say that our sins have incurred a "debt" in His eyes. He says that He is a forgiving God, so we ask Him to forgive. By predicating God's word-revelation of His deed-revelation, our thoughts are brought into accord with His.

Witsius appears to grasp the centrality of epistemological and justificational concerns to the petition. On p. 313 he makes the following statements:²⁶

Besides, God is the highest reason, and purest holiness, and is consequently a pattern to all rational creatures. In the exercise of that highest power, he has given to man a law, which describes and portrays his holiness so far as it can be imitated by man....That his love might appear to men more venerable and more lovely, he has confirmed it by promises of the greatest benefits, to be bestowed on all who adore his majesty and love his holiness, and by threatenings of the most dreadful curse to be inflicted through eternity on all that hate him and despise his commandments.

On p. 315 he quotes Ps. 19:13: "Who can understand his errors?" and follows this with:

"Our 'sin is written with a pen of iron and with the point of a diamond; it is graven upon the table or our heart.' [Jer. 17:1] With indelible characters it is written in the book of the Divine omniscience,--'the book of remembrance,' [Mal. 3:16] mentioned by the prophet Malachi,--from which God will 'set them in order before the eyes' [Psalm 50:21] of sinners, so that there will be no room for denial or evasion."

On p. 326 he notes further that "There is no inward calmness, no peace, till the mind, freed from the guilt of its iniquities, has nothing to fear from itself, from the Devil, or from God."

Matthew 7:1-5 explains and applies the petition as follows. In view of God's initial and continued forgiveness of our sins, removal of our guilt and redemption of our proper thinking and judgment, 1) we should not condemn our brothers but rather seek first to receive God's forgiveness and epistemological restoration in our own lives, then extend that same redemption to our brother (7:1-5). McCartney takes vv. 6-12 as a further elaboration of this petition. He may be correct. Perhaps 2) what should not be given to unholy people is holy truth (6); 3) we should ask for the "good thing" which is forgiveness (7-11), and 4) we should preserve justice in a loving way (12). Or something like that. But I am uncertain. McCartney's division may be right because v. 12 does seem to provide a conclusion to what precedes it ("and so..."). But perhaps these verses fall more appropriately under the last petition. Either way, vv. 1-5 clearly do follow the pattern of my thesis: they are concerned with both justification and epistemology, as they are integrally related to each other. The thesis is sustained. : )

Let us then conclude with a consideration of the eschatology of scripture's justificational epistemology. Man's knowledge was created perfect, in that it judged and discerned in accord with God's knowledge. But man's knowledge became perverted, and skewed, when Adam and Eve ate "bread" out of the serpent's hand, and believed his word rather than God's. God had presented Adam and Eve with the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil as an (epistemological) evaluation of their (admittedly ethical) obedience. If Adam and Eve obeyed, thereby exercising righteous discernment of the true distinction between good and evil, they would be judged to be righteous in God’s sight. If they disobeyed, they did so because they believed the lies - the false judgments - of Satan regarding what is good and what is evil, and as such would be judged by God to be unrighteous, to be guilty. Their thinking would be plagued with guilt from that time forward. They would live in fear of death all their lives. Scripture presents these issues of discerning good and evil, and of being preoccupied with guilt, as central in human epistemology (Heb. 2:15; 4:11-16; 5:11-14; 10:2, 22, 26-39). In the implementation of our justification God convicts us of our sin and of His righteousness (John 16:8-11, Rom. 12:2-3), and assures us of our newfound righteous standing before Him (1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-11, 29; 3:19-21), cleansing us from our guilty standing in His eyes as well as our sense of guilt in our own. We no longer suppress the truth in unrighteousness, but rather know that the judgment of God is according to truth. (Rom. 1:18; 2:2) It was Abraham’s faith in God’s righteous judgment, even in the prospect of justification through the Seed to come, which God imputed to Abraham as righteousness. (Gen. 22:18; Rom. 4:21-25; Gal. 3:1-9, 16, 29; Heb. 6:11-20; 11:17-18) It is because justification involves the redemption of our epistemology that Luther and the Reformers were right -- justification comes by faith alone,²⁷ not by works, so that no one can boast.²⁸ ²⁹ In the continued outflow of our initial justification we recognize the depth of our sin more and more, and the truth, righteousness, justice and mercy of God as well. Now we still see through a glass darkly, but in the perfection of our epistemology, and of our justification, we shall see God face to face, and know Him fully even as we are fully known. We know now that in the end, God's justice and truth will prevail. All accounts will be reckoned, all debts will be paid, all guilt will be punished, all mercy will be shown.³⁰ Just as the forgiveness of our sins cannot be fully complete until we cease sinning, so the perfection of our knowledge must await the removal of our noetic sins as well as the full proclamation of the extent of our sins, of God's righteousness, and of our righteousness in Christ on the Judgment Day.

There should be no doubt then that the fifth petition is a request for God to bring our epistemologies into accord with His, by continuing to apply our justification to us in our present experience as believers, as justification and epistemology center around the two modes of God's revelation: word and deed.

In the sixth petition we request God to bring our ethical activity into accord with His own, emphasizing both the absolute sovereignty of God's administration of the covenant, and our absolute responsibility in receiving His administration. As such, we are asking God to continue His work of sanctifying us which He began in us and will be faithful to complete to the uttermost.

The clause "Lead us not into temptation" has caused much undue consternation amongst the commentators, because it would appear that the petition implies that God is guilty for man's sin. Attempts at resolution have been made, either by softening the meaning of "lead" or of "temptation." Betz (1995 380-381) summarizes the problems with these approaches quite well: "These attempts, however, are not convincing. On the one hand, if the temptation the Lord's Prayer speaks of were only for the purpose of the good, one would have no need for asking God to desist from it. On the other hand, it cannot be a seduction to do evil because this would be irreconcilable with the notion of divine righteousness." Witsius recognizes the true answer: God sovereignly leads all men either into temptation or out of it, yet man remains fully responsible for his reception of and response to God's sovereign activity. God remains perfectly holy in all that He does, even when He leads men into temptation, and men are responsible to pattern their activity after God's holiness. Therefore we must pray for God to be active on our behalf, bringing our actions into accord with the holiness of His own actions. In view of God's absolute sovereignty, and man's absolute responsibility, we have only God to thank ("lead," "deliver"), and only ourselves to blame ("temptation"), for whatever happens, whether for good or ill. Neither God's sovereign administration of the covenant nor man's responsible reception of it may be softened; to mitigate the one is to mitigate the other.³¹ Therefore we pray, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one."

God's sovereign administration, then, is highlighted in the two verbs "lead" and "deliver." Man's responsible reception of the covenant is highlighted in the two words "temptation" and "evil" or "the evil one."

The larger catechism states that this petition is about sanctification. (Q&A 195) Witsius adds some further insight into the ethical nature of this petition's focus: it is about the "power and dominion" of evil (1839 359). He notes that "Chrysostom has properly observed, [Hom. VII. On the Acts of the Apostles] that poneron (evil) is derived apo tou ponou, from labour." (360) and quotes Paul where he says "And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work." Further, he notes that the "evil one" is called such "because he does nothing but what is evil." (361)

D. A. Carson is probably right that the apo ("from") implies that tou ponerou should be translated as a person, "the evil one."³² But Hagner (1993 151) does well to observe that "The difference between Satan and evil is small in the present petition: to pray to be free from one is to pray to be free from the other."

Matthew 7:13-27 explains and applies this sixth petition, saying that 1) there are two gates we may actively enter in life, and two roads we may travel; we are responsible to enter by the narrow gate that leads to life, following the way that is in accord with God's holy dealings with us (13-14); 2) we must recognize false prophets by their fruits--their evil deeds--and we must reject those prophets as God rejects them (15-20); 3) entrance into the kingdom of heaven is only granted to "the one who does the will of my Father," and not merely to those who "do many mighty works," because some such men are "workers of lawlessness"--their deeds are not in accord with God's deeds, because they do not follow God's law (21-23); and 4) the result of "hearing these words of mine and doing them" is that one's life will be built on a firm foundation and will endure against every ethical onslaught, even the implied final destruction of eternal torment in hell coming upon all evildoers (24-27). It is possible, in light of the thesis of this paper, that McCartney's classification of vv. 6-12 under the fifth rather than sixth petition may be incorrect. I am not certain. But they do have something to do with our active reception of God's sovereign administration: 1) Out of respect for God's holy activity, we must actively guard what is holy from being profaned among those who would use it in a way which does not accord with God's holiness (6); 2) we must actively seek good gifts from God, because He delights to give them to those who ask Him (7-11); and 3) in view of God's perfect dealings with us, we should therefore do to others only that which we know by analogy from God's good treatment of us, is proper and good for them to do to us. But again, presently I feel less comfortable making bold statements about vv. 6-12.

As we did with the other petitions, we should reflect on the eschatological aspect of sanctification which is expressed in this petition. God made man holy, but man fell into active sin; in fact, man was bound in sin such that he could do nothing but disobey God's law. In redemption God sovereignly grants man the ability once again to obey His law, and so we must work out our salvations with fear and trembling, for it is God who is at work in us to will and to do according to His good pleasure. Toward this end we must ask God to deliver us from evil. He then causes us to abound more and more in holiness in the progress of our sanctification, until He finally presents us to Himself as His holy bride, without spot or wrinkle. Then we, and all things, will be declared "HOLY TO THE LORD" as Zechariah foretold, and all activity of men and of angels will be brought into accord with His holy activity, in the New Heavens and New Earth, in which righteousness dwells.

The sixth petition, then, is quite easily understood to be our petition for God to continue to sanctify us by bringing our responsible reception of the covenant into accord with His own sovereign administration of it; to bring our ethics into accord with His.

Tertullian was right, then. The Lord's prayer is a breviary of the gospel. I can see how through these requests we are led into the whole of biblical religion as through a doorway. These are a window on the whole of the ordo salutis, the central blessings of salvation, as well as on the whole of the structure of the covenant, which is the whole of our relation with God; itself patterned after the sum of God in all His being, thought, and activity. The covenant structures all of reality, and the eschatological aspect of regeneration, justification, and sanctification--or metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, if you will--as expressed in these petitions leads us to understand the comprehensive eschatology expressed in the whole of scripture.

It is no wonder, then, that both the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer have found their way to places of the highest prominence in the liturgy of the church. They both are central expressions of the structure and proclamation of the covenant. In the former God commands us to do what He requires of us, and in the latter, we request God to give what He has commanded.

Once the meaning of these last three petitions is understood, we see that they form such a unified whole, and that they fit so perfectly into the systematic and historical structure of the covenant, that the critical perspectives and their critiques pale in significance. If one of the petitions was not original to Jesus, we could ask how anyone more ingenious and divinely-inspired than He could have foreseen the perfect fit these petitions would have with the later development of Pauline theology. If one of them was not original to Jesus, we could ask how the systematic perfection of their three rubrics of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics--categories recognized by many philosophers (including Van Til) to be the sum of all fields, the most general heads under which theoretical investigation may proceed--could later be achieved by Christ's church. Without regeneration and providence there could be no justification; without justification there could be no sanctification; without sanctification justification and regeneration would have no goal, God's kingdom would not come, His power would not be manifested, and His glory would not be displayed.³³

[I should make further comments here about the implications the context of Matt. 6:16-7:27 has for both Christianity and the critics, once I do a more careful exegesis of that context.]

We further should have come to recognize the way in which these petitions are fully Jewish in that they are picking up the central concerns of the first three commandments, and thereby of the Mosaic Covenant, the Pentateuch, and the whole Old Testament. Further, they speak about the New Covenant and its central blessings as they were promised in the prophets, produced in Christ, preached by Paul, personalized by the Spirit, and will be perfected in glory. As such the petitions are profoundly Christian, and completely Christian. They are a breviary of the gospel.

Further, we have come to understand the reason for the order in which the petitions are presented. The order is the order of salvation, of regeneration-justification-sanctification, and the order of metaphysics-epistemology-ethics. A man must be regenerated in order to have faith and obedience; his new heart is a believing heart. A man must have faith in order to be justified and to be sanctified. A man must have a pure heart and be reconciled to God in justification for God's Spirit to dwell in him, and to do His sanctifying work in him. Similarly, a man must have being before he can think, will, and feel, and must have being about which to think, will, and feel, and ethical activity can only be performed by a thinking, willing, feeling being. This alone explains the order of the petitions.

We have come to see the whole of the gospel, and the whole of a Christian system of philosophy within it. The primary fields in which Christian philosophy must investigate are metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Regeneration is central to the redemption of metaphysics; justification to the redemption of epistemology, and sanctification to the redemption of ethics. These are the central concerns within those fields. Metaphysics is concerned about God's existence in commitment and requirement toward Himself and then to us, and about our commitments and requirements toward God, as well. Epistemology is concerned about God's words being predicated of His deeds, the revelation of this predication to us, and our response of predication in word and deed. Ethics is concerned about God's sovereign administration of the covenant, and about man's responsible reception of and response to God's administration. These are the central organizing structures within each of those fields. This biblical philosophy goes a long way already to resolving the major problems in the history of philosophy.³⁴ In metaphysics, it states that personal commitment and requirement are equally ultimate, but that commitments--especially God's--retain the primacy. In epistemology, it states that words and deeds are equally ultimate, but the words retain the interpretive primacy. And in ethics, it states that sovereignty and responsibility are equally ultimate, but that sovereignty retains the primacy. Keeping these relations and priorities straight in each field will lead to a proper understanding of each field. And in all things it maintains that God is the original, and that man and creation are derivative from and analogous to God. In this way alone may God's glory remain primary from the beginning, throughout, and to the end. And so at every point in a truly Christian theology, and a truly Christian philosophy, we must cry that "from Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things. To Him be the glory forever!"

Lastly, we have come to grasp the eschatology of the petitions. Their eschatology is that of the historia salutis, the history of salvation. They find their origin in creation, their necessity in the fall, their emphasis in redemption, their present reality and focus in the continued application of redemption in the life of a converted Christian, and their ultimate goal in the glorification of man to the greater glory of God. As a result they have concern both for the present and the final future, but also for the past. They may be prayed most naturally by the Christian, but if a non-Christian prays the prayer he is on his way to salvation; he is being brought into the eschatology of the petitions. And thereby, he is being brought into accord with God.

The last three petitions are our request for God to bring our metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics into accord with His own, by means of regeneration, justification, and sanctification, in the sum-total of their eschatological progress.

Critical scholarship is itself critiqued by the perfection of the biblical text and its message. The petitions stand firm against whatever foes may assail them, for they are the gospel, the solid bedrock of truth, for they are the very words of God.

Let us pray them, then, that God's name may be hallowed, His kingdom come, and His will be done, in earth as it is in heaven, for His is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory forever!

Black, Tim. "A Transcendental Analysis and Critique of Dooyeweerd’s Distinction between Na�ve and Theoretical Thought." (2001) Term paper for the Principles of Christian Apologetics course.

Black, Tim. "The Structure of Teaching Authority, from Trinity to Church to Family: The Reason for Male Teaching Eldership." (2001) Term paper for the Doctrine of the Church course.

Black, Tim. "The Ten Commandments and the Covenant: Life according to God." (2001) Term paper for the Old Testament History and Theology course. Exegesis of the first 3 commandments, showing the way they manifest the structure of the covenant, and briefly how what they require is what God gives in regeneration, justification, and sanctification, and is what we request in the last 3 petitions of the Lord's Prayer. The current paper is the intended second half of the project begun in this paper.

Bauckham, Richard, ed. "For Whom Were The Gospels Written." In The Gospels for All Christians. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 9-48.

Betz, Hans Dieter. The Sermon on the Mount. Ed. Adela Yarbro Collins. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995).

Davies, W. D., and Allison, Dale C. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Gospel according to Saint Matthew: In Three Volumes. Vol. 1: Introduction and Commentary on Matthew I-VII. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988). Part of the International Critical Commentary series.

Hagner, Donald A. Matthew 1-13. Word Biblical Commentary. (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1993).

Jeremias, Joachim. "The Lord's Prayer in the Light of Recent Research." Trans. John Reumann. In The Prayers of Jesus. By Joachim Jeremias. (Naperville, IL: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1967).

Luz, Ulrich. Matthew 1-7: A Commentary. Trans. Wilhelm C. Linss. (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1989).

Metzger, Bruce M A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament. Second Edition. (Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 1994).

Metzger, Bruce M. "How Many Times Does 'Epiousios' Occur Outside the Lord's Prayer?" The Expository Times, 69 (1957), pp. 52-54.

Morison, James. A Practical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew. (Minneapolis, MN: Klock & Klock Christian Publishers, 1884, 1981 reprint).

Plummer, Alfred. An Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew. (Minneapolis, MN: James Family Christian Publishers, n.d.).

Ridderbos, Herman N. Matthew. Trans. Ray Togtman. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1987).

Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Larger Catechism, (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.) 1995.

Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Shorter Catechism, (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.) 1995.

Witsius, Herman. Sacred Dissertations on The Lord's Prayer. Trans. William Pringle. (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1839).

Wolters, Albert M. Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for A Reformational Worldview. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985).

Black, Tim. The Biblical Hermeneutics of Geerhardus Vos: An Analysis, Critique, And Reconstruction. (1998). Bachelor's thesis at Covenant College, submitted for the Biblical Studies and Sociology majors. Draws implications from the structure of the covenant to suggest revisions to Vos' hermeneutics.

Black, Tim. The Glory of God in the Covenant. (2001) Term paper for the Doctrine of God course. Demonstrates how the biblical presentation of God's glory follows the structure of the covenant.

Boice, James Montgomery. The Sermon on the Mount. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1972).

Bultmann, Rudolf. Theology of the New Testament: Complete in One Volume. Trans. Kendrick Grobel. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951, 1955).

Carson, D. A. The Sermon on the Mount: An Evangelical Exposition of Matthew 5-7. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1978).

Ebeling, Gerhard. On Prayer: Nine Sermons. Trans. James W. Leitch. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966).

Jeremias, Joachim. The Lord's Prayer. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964). Translation of Das Vater-Unser im Lichte der neueren Forschung.

Ladd, George Eldon. Jesus and the Kingdom: The Eschatology of Biblical Realism. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

Schweizer, Eduard. The Good News According to Matthew. Trans. David E. Green. (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1975).

Strecker, Georg. The Sermon on the Mount: An Exegetical Commentary. Trans. O. C. Dean, Jr. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1988).

Tertullian, De Oratione, PL 1, 1153-65; trans. Bibliothek der Kirchenv�ter I/7 248-73 = "Prayer," Tertullian--Disciplinary, Moral and Ascetical Works, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 40, pp. 153-90 (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1959).

Vos, Howard F. Matthew: A Study Guide Commentary. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1979).

Wenham, David. The Parables of Jesus. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1989).

Young, Brad H. Jesus and His Jewish Parables: Rediscovering the Roots of Jesus' Teaching. (New York: Paulist Press, 1989).

Young, Brad. The Jewish Background to the Lord's Prayer. (Austin: The Center for Judaic-Christian Studies, 1984), pp. 23-27.

4Metzger (1994 14) says "The absence of any ascription in early and important representatives of the Alexandrian (a [aleph], B), the Western (D and most of the Old Latin), and other (f ¹) types of text, as well as early patristic commentaries on the Lord's Prayer (those of Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian), suggest that an ascription, usually in a threefold form, was composed (perhaps on the basis of 1 Chr 29.11-13) in order to adapt the Prayer for liturgical use in the early church. Still later scribes added 'of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.'" (Addition of "[aleph]" is mine because the Hebrew font may not display properly on some reader's computers.)

5Confer with Luz (1989 374): "We ask: To what extent is the Christian faith the presupposition and content of the Lord's Prayer?" "As the prayer of the new covenant, the Lord's Prayer is considered as un-Jewish....Is it 'new' and if so, in what is it new?" Also on pp. 387-388: "Understood as a dogmatic basic text, it reflected, e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity. The first and fourth petitions concerned God the Father, the second and fifth the Savior, the third and sixth the Holy Spirit. Maximus Confessor understood the Lord's Prayer as a compendium of dogmatics, of mysticism, and of philosophy. In view of this interpretation of the Lord's Prayer as a basic text of ecclesiastical doctrine, one must not be surprised that the Enlightenment reversed the thrust; here the Lord's Prayer became the basic text of Christian doctrine precisely because it did not contain the traditional subjects of Christian dogmatics, as, e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity!"

7This last point is Dr. Dan McCartney's thesis, presented in his Gospels class, that the portion of the Sermon on the Mount following the Lord's Prayer follows the structure and meaning of the last 3 petitions of the Prayer. McCartney holds that the petitions deal with material, social, and moral needs, respectively. I seek to refine his thesis by showing that the meaning of the petitions has to do with regeneration-justification-sanctification, and metaphysics-epistemology-ethics, and is a New Covenant fulfillment of the first 3 commandments. I have not done much work yet, though, on this interpretation of the latter portion of the Sermon on the Mount; that aspect of this paper is still in progress.

The implications, though, are far-reaching. 1) Jesus dealt with some of the other commandments in the first half of the Sermon (esp. 5:17-20, 21ff., 27ff., 33ff., 43ff.), in this latter half He continues, but with comments on the central issues of the covenant; the first 3 commandments are more central than the rest. 2) Further, by introducing those 3 in the Lord's Prayer, then explaining and applying them in the sections that follow, He is imitating the pattern found in Deuteronomy, where the Ten Commandments are given in ch. 5 and each explained/applied in turn in ch.'s 6-26. Jesus is giving the Torah-teaching of the New Covenant.

But the implications go even further. 3) The conclusion of this paper is that the central teaching of Moses is the central teaching of Jesus, is the central teaching of Paul. I do not believe this conclusion has been drawn before in this way.

4) Further, the perfect harmony throughout this unified presentation argues strongly against the critics who seek to remove portions of the petitions, or whole petitions, from the Lord's Prayer. To declare one of the petitions as not original to Christ is to call into question the originality of a full one third of the latter half of the Sermon on the Mount (!), and to deny to some extent its close dependence upon the Ten Commandments of the Old Covenant and its later fruition in Paul's theology. The Sermon is so tightly integrated throughout that one iota or tittle cannot be subtracted from it without wreaking havoc with the structure and message of the whole, as well as the benefits received in the life of its hearers. Some critics think the 6^th petition is not original to Jesus. But did Jesus not care to proclaim the meaning and implications of sanctification?? May it never be!

12"Now, if we ask which form is the original--the longer form of Matthew or the shorter form of Luke--the decisive observation, which has not yet been mentioned, is the following: the shorter form of Luke is completely contained in the longer form of Matthew. This makes it very probable that the Matthean form is an expanded one, for according to all that we know about the tendency of liturgical texts to conform to certain laws in their transmission, in a case where the shorter version is contained in the longer one, the shorter text is to be regarded as original. No one would have dared to shorten a sacred text like the Lord's Prayer and to leave out two petitions if they had formed part of the original tradition. On the contrary, the reverse is amply attested, that in the early period, before wordings were fixed, liturgical texts were elaborated, expanded, and enriched." (1967 89-90) I think, however, that precisely the opposite is the case. It is wrong for the evangelists to ascribe words to Jesus which Jesus did not say (cf. Rev. 1:1-3, 22:18-19), and is not wrong for them to decide for certain purposes (cf. John 20:30-31, 21:25) not to quote some things which Jesus did say.

15Witsius recognizes this: "My view of the matter is this. It is the will of God that man should consist of a soul and a body united. For both parts he has laid down his laws, that in both the image of his holiness might be seen. To both he has promised rewards, that in both his truth and goodness might shine. On both he bestows the acts of his bounty, that both might form a mirror of his providence. Nay, Christ himself obeyed and suffered, both in soul and in body, that he might not only bless our soul, but might make our body 'like unto his own glorious body.' Since, therefore, both parts of us are so much the objects of the Divine care, we are bound by the Divine example to take care of both." (1839 268-269)

16The impersonal creation is oriented to God because of God's own personal commitment toward Himself which He expresses toward Himself through that impersonal creation, and because of God's requirements toward Himself which He also expresses through that creation. As such, God relates in something like a covenantal manner to the impersonal creation, because He relates in a covenantal manner to Himself through the impersonal creation. As such we may speak of a "covenant" with creation, but only after a fashion. This brings to light the fact that metaphysics is centered around persons in a covenant relationship. Even impersonal beings have their existence by virtue of a Person, and a covenantal relationship. This goes far to explain many of the struggles had by unbelieving philosophy in regard to metaphysics. (These comments on Heidegger need better research behind them; they are somewhat speculative, I think:) Heidegger considers all impersonal being to be "being at hand," or "being for use" (by a human person), but cannot explain the ultimate ground of all personality and relationship, but the Christian does--in God's personal relation to Himself through the impersonal creation. For Heidegger, the relation of the "ultimate ground" of all being and beings to that Being itself is one of such absolute, utter contradiction, that no personal relation of God to man or to His creatures in such a context can be conceived. As such there is no possibility that man has a personal relation to the things around himself, for Heidegger denies God's covenantal relations which undergird and come to expression in man's covenantal relations. Here I am using Heidegger as simply an example of the modern metaphysics implied by Kant's epistemology as it employs the Subject-Object, form-content, phenomenal-noumenal, and Nature-Freedom distinctions. Similar comments could be made about Kant, Hegel, and Husserl, insofar as they retain the essential elements of Kant's Nature-Freedom dialectic. Other issues are given a more clear formulation and a fuller meaning when understood in the context of God's covenantal relations, as well. Necessity and contingency are due to God's commitments and requirements. Their relation is one of equal ultimacy, of the priority of necessity over contingency, and of perfect harmony, because such is the relation of God's commitments and requirements. Insofar as beings exist ("God"), they are determined in their being; insofar as they are personally committed ("our God"), they are freely self-determined in their being. A similar point could be made about the relation of sovereignty and responsibility to determinism and freedom in the realm of ethical activity: God's sovereignty determines our actions; in our responsibility we exercise freedom which is in accord with God's sovereignty.

17The personal creatures (especially man, but also angels and demons) relate to God by being personally committed to Him, or at least, they are required to be personally committed to Him. They are beings that are committed.

This way of putting it has much in common with the way the Westminster Standards speak of God. In the Shorter Catechism's Q&A's 46 and 47, God is described as "God, and our God." He is God, a being in Himself. But He is also our God, God committed to bless us, and the one to whom we belong and to whom we are committed ourselves. Likewise, the Shorter Catechism Q&A 4 ("What is God? God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth.") treats God in Himself, and then is followed by two Q&A's (5 & 6) which continue the same subject, then by Q&A's 7 and following which treat God's decrees and their execution in His works of creation and providence (and redemption.) But note what God's decrees are: "His eternal purpose, according to the counsel of His will, whereby, for His own glory, He hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." They are His commitments. It is on the basis of what scripture teaches about what we are to believe concerning who God is and what His commitments are, that scripture also teaches what duty God requires of man. This outline of the Catechism, given in Q&A 3, is based in precisely the same rationale I am drawing from the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer: the metaphysics of the covenant is that of God's being in commitment, and His requirement of our being in reciprocal commitment.

We might note that there are interesting parallels here with Al Wolters' distinction in Creation Regained between the structure and direction of cultural realities. He says the structure is good, and generally does not need to be redeemed, and the direction in which they are used (for good or bad) is what primarily needs to be redeemed. He is working on a metaphysics of culture, but also on a general metaphysics. His metaphysics becomes the basis of his ethics. All things are to be considered good (structure) so long as they are received with thanksgiving (1 Tim. 4:4), and used to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31--direction).

21"But in what manner does prayer for those blessings by which this animal life is to be supported, conduce to the glory of our Heavenly Father? (1.) We declare that our life is in the hand of God, who alone gave it to us,--who alone preserves it by his power and goodness, and administers those aids without which, according to the order which he has himself appointed, life cannot be preserved....(2.) We extol that providence of God, by which, at stated seasons of the year, he blesses the productions of the earth." (1839 293)

24I struggle to clearly state how it is that God continually declares to us anew and personally in our daily experience and reception of justification what He has declared from all eternity: that we are forgiven and righteous in His sight. The general point here is that our request has to do with both God's epistemology and ours. A new declaration is given to us by God, and a new knowledge or understanding is received by us, when we pray this petition. Krabbendam states it this way: that there is both a "once-and-for-all" aspect of the implementation (or application) of justification in the life of the believer at conversion, and there is a "continuing outflow" in continued daily repentance and reception of forgiveness. He even goes so far as to say that there is a final justification--the perfection of our justification--at the judgment day. Which reminds me that somewhere in this paper I ought to mention that I am building on his unified structure of the ordo and historia salutis. In summary, he says that God the Father promised regeneration, justification, and sanctification, in Jeremiah 31 and Ezekiel 36, God the Son produced or personified regeneration, justification, and sanctification, God the Spirit personalizes them, and in our glorification they are finally perfected. If only I could footnote every dependence I have on Krabbendam and others!

25Admittedly, the whole discussion of the function of the word "as" and the relation of the two halves of this petition is truly very difficult to carry out properly. Which comes first--God's forgiveness or man's? Many commentators come to the same conclusion I do--that the petition assumes and teaches that God's forgiveness is primary and man's secondary and derivative--but fail to demonstrate specifically how the text itself proves this conclusion. One could easily think that they are pulling the wool over our eyes, especially in light of the causal or logical order implied in Matt. 6:14-15: in some way, man's forgiveness is a necessary condition of God's forgiveness. I don't claim to have done the most stellar job of proving my point either, but I think the answer lies in the way that the first half requests God to forgive on the basis of His knowledge, and the second half describes our knowledge of what it means to forgive. This is clear enough in the text. It is true that the reasoning of the petition--in the grammatical, syntactical, and semantic functioning of the word "as"--begins with our knowledge and concludes to God's forgiveness: because we know that we forgive, therefore, God, forgive us our debts. But despite the direction of this argument, the petition clearly refers to God's knowledge first, and ours second, and indicates that our knowledge is only correct if it is derived from God's. It is not we who teach God, but God who teaches us. It is only because we have learned from Him about forgiveness ("as we forgive our debtors") that we have a reason to ask Him for His forgiveness. But clearly, because of the difference between God and man, it is God's forgiveness that stands out as the more important of the two, as the more foundational and original. Thus what we have learned from God is not merely what human forgiveness is, but rather the only way we have properly come to understand human forgiveness is by seeing in it the pattern of God's more foundational forgiveness of us. In order to understand His forgiveness of us, we must come to an adequate knowledge of God's justice and His mercy in a manner like unto the way He knows them to be. Thus the passage truly is placing God's knowledge first as the original from which our knowledge must be derived. But this is a hard point to prove!

26Note that Witsius is quoting the 2^nd Commandment in order to explain this petition! He cannot help but recognize the close connection of these two texts; they are dealing with the same issue.

It is fascinating to note throughout scripture as well--in other passages than the ones I have mentioned--the close connection that is often made between justification and epistemology. They are so often conjoined in scripture that I am amazed I have not heard someone else mention the fact before! Notwithstanding the Reformation's emphasis on justification by faith alone, I have not heard "justification" mentioned much if at all when the topic of a Christian "epistemology" is covered, nor have I heard "epistemology" mentioned as the general field within which "justification" plays out most of its role.

27This sola needs quite a bit of qualification. The central point of it is that justification comes through faith primarily and only secondarily through other parts of salvation -- faith in God’s promises comes before obedience to His law, faith in His word before interpretation of His deeds, faith in His sovereign administration before responsible reception of it and response to it. Yet it should be fairly obvious that faith and obedience are inseparable and even coextensive with one another, as is the case with faith and interpretation, and faith and reception/response. The point here is that the first things must come first; that was the point in the Reformation as well.

28We might further reflect that the redemption of our epistemology has three aspects to it within this metaphysics-epistemology-ethics structure. Metaphysically, our mind is recreated in our regeneration, for in the biblical perspective our new heart is a new heart which thinks, wills, and feels; it is the whole inner man. In regeneration we are given a new epistemological apparatus. Epistemologically, our knowledge is renewed; this I now understand to be closely related to justification, if not summarily comprehended within justification. Ethically, our thinking (as it is our responsible, receptive, responsive activity as personal agents) is renewed in our sanctification. Admittedly, when we think of the redemption of our epistemology we often think of it primarily in this last connection; we think of it as an aspect of our sanctification. But it appears best to me to understand that the redemption of our epistemology involves changes in all three areas: being, knowledge, and activity. Of these three areas, knowledge is more central to epistemology than are being and activity. As such we should re-evaluate our tendency to think that the redemption of our epistemology is primarily ethical in nature. Our epistemology is redeemed when God retrains our thinking on its proper objects of God’s words and deeds, giving His word the interpretive priority over His deeds, in order that we might interpret them in accord with God’s own interpretation of them, thereby understanding God’s message as it is revealed to man; the proclamation of His glory in His covenant with us. We could say alternatively that God retrains our thinking on its proper objects of His covenantal commitments and requirements, as expressed or formulated in His promises and laws, and brings our knowledge into accord with the two modes of His revelation, word and deed. This rewording might better maintain the ontological nature of the objects of knowledge and the epistemological nature of knowledge itself. But I am unclear here. The general point remains: the respective redemptions of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics are all mutually interdependent, yet each retain as primary the characteristics of their own nature. The new heart in regeneration is a new being, the new record in justification is a new knowledge, the new life in sanctification is a new activity.

31On the one hand, if we are not responsible, then doesn't that also imply that God is not sovereign enough to hold us responsible? That He is unable to make us capable of responding freely and willingly? But He is great enough, and sovereign enough, to do it!! On the other hand, if God is not sovereign, then how can He hold us responsible for our actions? And how could He make us so amazingly capable in our activity? But God has made us responsible!! People are too willing to think that the one must be had without the other; in denying the one they lose all they wanted to retain in the other. But let us exalt our God with David, saying "I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Wonderful are your works; my soul knows it full well." (Psalm 139:14)

34This would be a good topic for a further paper: showing how this outline of the structure of the covenant provides the answers for which the central discussions in the history of philosophy have sought. The paper could follow the outline of the history of philosophy given by Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and Krabbendam (Ancient philosophy is characterized by the Form-Matter dialectic where Form is universalistic and Matter is particularistic, Medieval philosophy is characterized by the Grace-Nature dialectic where Grace is universalistic and Nature is particularistic, and Modern philosophy is characterized by the Freedom-Nature dialectic where Freedom is particularistic, and Nature is universalistic), and show how the relations between universality and particularity in the Godhead (equal ultimacy, primacy of universality, harmony--see my paper on "The Structure of Teaching Authority from Trinity to Church to Family...") as they are expressed in the structure of the covenant (universal-particular pairs of commitment-requirement, word-deed, and sovereign administration-responsible reception) bring resolution to the central dialectical problems which arise in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as they arise in the three major periods of the history of philosophy. My paper on Dooyeweerd's distinction between na�ve and theoretical thought ("A Transcendental Analysis and Critique of Dooyeweerd’s Distinction between Na�ve and Theoretical Thought") is an attempt to show the implications of the word-deed pair for Modern epistemological discussions following from Kant's Nature-Freedom dialectic as it is revised by Husserl and not fully critiqued and reconstructed along biblical lines by Dooyeweerd.